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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

9 VALERIE RHODES, a single woman,
10 and on behalf of others similarly situated,

11 Plaintiff,

12 vs.

13 WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
14 ASSOCIATION, A National Banking
15 Association

16 Defendant.

NO. 2:17-CV-0093-SMJ

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND SERVICE
AWARD

Noted for Hearing:
December 18, 2018
10:30 a.m.

With Oral Argument

CLASS ACTION

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20 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND SERVICE AWARD

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

2

3 I. INTRODUCTION 1

4 II. RELEVANT FACTS..... 1

5 A. Plaintiff and Class Counsel diligently pursued relief for the Class despite

6 challenges..... 1

7 B. The Settlement. 6

8 III. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 6

9 A. The percentage-of-the-fund method is the appropriate method for determining a

10 reasonable attorneys’ fee in this case..... 6

11 B. A fee award request of 12.5% of the common fund is reasonable under the

12 circumstances..... 8

13 1. Class Counsel achieved an exceptional result for the class. 9

14 2. Class Counsel assumed a significant risk of no recovery..... 11

15 3. Class Counsel’s skill and performance delivered a significant recovery for the

16 class that included benefits beyond the cash settlement. 15

17 4. Awards in similar cases demonstrate that the requested fee is reasonable. 16

18 C. A lodestar crosscheck is not required but confirms that the requested fee is

19 reasonable. 17

20 1. Class Counsel’s rates are consistent with rates in the community for similar

work performed by professionals with comparable skill, experience, and

reputation. 18

1 2. Class Counsel expended a reasonable number of hours litigating the case..... 19

2 3. The implied multiplier is reasonable and appropriate..... 21

3 4. The implied multiplier is reasonable under the circumstances..... 23

4 D. Plaintiff requests a service award of \$10,000. 26

5 IV. CONCLUSION27

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Court Opinions

1

2

3

4 *Barjon v. Dalton*,
132 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1997) 18

5 *Bayat v. Bank of the West*, No. C-13-2376EMC,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50416 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) 24

6 *Bess v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC*,
727 Fed. Appx. 918 (9th Cir. 2018) 10, 13, 14

7 *Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, Inc.*, No. C10-00463LHK,
8 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, *5 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 30, 2011) 23

9 *Cnty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC*, No. 13-cv-3016-TOR
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92110, *23 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2016) 19

10 *Craft v. City of San Bernardino*,
624 F. Supp.2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 22, 22-23

11 *Democratic Party of Wash. v. Reed*,
12 388 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2004) 20

13 *Desio v. Emercon Electric Co.*,
No. 2:15-CV-00346-SMJ, ECF No. 84 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2018) 16

14 *Gates v. Deukmejian*,
987 F.3d 1392–08 (9th Cir. 1992) 18

15 *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, No. C-16-4068MMC,
16 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, *46 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) 17

17 *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*,
331 F. Appx. 452 (9th Cir. 2009) 17

18 *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*,
150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) 7

19 *Hensley v. Eckerhart*,
461 U.S. 424 (1983) 19

20

1 *Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp., No. 11-CV-02786-LHK,*
 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16838 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) 21

2 *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.,*
 3 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) 7, 8, 17, 18, 23, 24

4 *In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig.,*
 243 F.ed 722, 732 (3d Cir. 2001) 24

5 *In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,*
 109 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 1997) 8

6 *In re Infospace*
 7 330 F. Supp.2d 1203–14 (W.D. Wash. 2004) 19

8 *In re Omnivision,*
 559 F. Supp. 2d6 11

9 *In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.,*
 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015) 11-12, 17, 18, 26

10 *In re Rite Aid Corp. Secs. Litig.,*
 11 362 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Pa. 2005) 23

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 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65931, *613–14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2017) 24

13 *In re Wash. Public Power,*
 19 F.3d 12

14 *Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-0175-TOR,*
 15 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193000 (E. D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2017) 10, 14, 15, 24

16 *Jordan v. Nationstar Mort., LLC,*
 240 F. Supp.3d 1114 (E.D. Wash. 2017) 13

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 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20420, *8 (9th Cir. Jul. 23, 2018) 25

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 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162894 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2017) 14

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 20 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975) 23

1 *Lehman v. Nelson*, 2015 U.S. Dist.
 LEXIS 180785, *18 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2015) 27

2 *Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers*,

3 904 F.2d 1301 (9 Cir. 1990) 11

4 *Moreno v. City of Sacramento*,

534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008)..... 20, 21

5 *Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am.*,

796 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2010) 22

6 *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*,

7 592 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1330, n.9 (W.D. Wash. 2009) 27

8 *Perkins v LinkedIn Corp., No. 13-cv-04303-LHK*,

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18649 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) 10, 15, 19, 26-27

9 *Plumbers Union Local No. 12, Pension Fund v. Ambassadors Group Inc.*,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26232 (E.D. Wash., Feb. 28, 2012) 16, 19

10 *Rinky Dink, Inc. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC*,

11 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70858, *18 (W.D. Wash. May. 31, 2016)..... 27

12 *Roberts v. Texaco*,

979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) 23

13 *Rodriguez v. W. Publishing*,

563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009)..... 26

14 *Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co.*

248 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir. 2007) 22

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16 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9705 (E.D. Pa. 2005) 23

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557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977) 25

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290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) passim

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1 *Widrig v. Apfel*,
140 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1998) 18

2
3 **State Cases**

4 *Bess v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. C15-5020BHS*
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32367 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2015) 13, 22

5 *Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.*,
100 Wn.2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983) 18

6 *Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*,
121 Wn.2d 52, 72, 847 P.2d 440 (1993) 7, 25

7 *Forbes v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. W.*,
170 Wn.2d 157–66, 240 P.3d 790 (2010) 16

8
9 **State Statutes**

10 RCW 4.24.630..... 2

11 RCW 19.86, et. seq 2, 3, 4, 5

12 **Federal Rules**

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 10

14 **Other Authorities**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff and Class Counsel aggressively but efficiently litigated this class action and
3 achieved a significant common fund settlement of \$26,305,000.00 for over 4,000 Class
4 members. To compensate them for their efforts, Class Counsel request a fee of
5 \$3,288,125—just 12.5% of the common fund. Their request is half of the 25% of common
6 fund benchmark recognized by the Ninth Circuit and accounts for the excellent results they
7 obtained for the Class.

8 Class Counsel also respectfully request this Court approve a service award to named
9 Plaintiff Valarie Rhodes, in the amount of \$10,000 for her dedicated work on behalf of the
10 Class.

11 **II. RELEVANT FACTS**

12 **A. Plaintiff and Class Counsel diligently pursued relief for the Class despite
13 challenges.**

14 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 12, 2016, alleging that the Defendant
15 engaged in a systemic practice of unlawful pre-foreclosure entries and lock changes upon
16 Washington borrowers' homes. ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff alleged that these pre-foreclosure
17 entries and lock changes (1) damaged the Class member's existing doors and locks; (2)
18 denied Class members their right to exclusively possess their homes prior to completion of
19 a foreclosure; and (3) in certain cases involved the unauthorized removal of the Class
20 members' personal property. *Id.* Plaintiff asserted claims for common law trespass,

1 intentional trespass (RCW 4.24.630), violations of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act
2 (RCW 19.86, *et. seq.*), and conversion. *Id.*

3 Class Counsel came to this case with extensive experience litigating class-wide
4 claims against companies that order and perform pre-foreclosure lock changes and
5 “property preservation activities” on default borrowers’ homes in Washington state.
6 Declaration of Clay M. Gatens in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and
7 Service Award (“Gatens Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2, 3, 4. This experience allowed Class Counsel to
8 efficiently investigate Plaintiff’s claims, analyze the risks of recovering class-wide
9 damages, focus the litigation strategy, and aggressively advance the litigation on behalf of
10 Plaintiff and the Class. *Id.* at ¶ 4.

11 Class Counsel’s experience also informed Class Counsel of the significant litigation
12 challenges and risk that surrounded this case. *Id.* These risks included on-going challenges
13 to class wide adjudication of these types of claims, challenges to liability, threats of federal
14 preemption of Washington law, untested damages theories, and a legislative attempt to
15 procure retroactive immunity for defendants that engaged in pre-foreclosure lock changes.
16 *See* Sections B–C, *infra*.

17 Despite knowing full well the potential challenges and risk, Plaintiff and Class
18 Counsel brought this suit in late 2016. ECF No. 1-2. From the outset, the parties
19 aggressively litigated the case; discovery disputes began almost immediately. Gatens
20 Decl., at ¶ 5. Defendant’s discovery productions ultimately comprised of 38 distinct

1 productions totaling of over 28,000 pages of documents and approximately 5.96 gigabytes
2 of data. *Id.* at ¶ 6. But discovery disputes continued. *Id.* at ¶¶ 5–7. Plaintiff ultimately filed
3 a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses on September 8, 2017. ECF No. 21.

4 While waiting for the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery
5 Responses, Class Counsel continued their discovery review and prepared for exhaustive
6 Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of Defendant’s corporate designees. Gatens Decl. at ¶ 7. These
7 depositions took place over two days in Des Moines, Iowa and resulted in 525 pages of
8 deposition testimony and entry of 43 exhibits. *Id.* They largely substantiated Plaintiff’s and
9 Class Counsel’s liability and damage theories and further demonstrated the appropriateness
10 of determining the viability of those theories on a class wide basis. *Id.*, at ¶ 7, Ex. A.

11 Soon after completing Defendant’s 30(b)(6) deposition, Class Counsel prepared and
12 sent to Defendant a demand letter containing a comprehensive analysis and calculation of
13 Defendant’s liability and damages exposure. *Id.*, at Ex A. Class Counsel also incorporated
14 into their letter favorable rulings on class certification and liability that they had obtained
15 in other cases challenging pre-foreclosure lock changes. *Id.* These favorable rulings,
16 coupled with Defendant’s 30(b)(6) designees’ testimony, bolstered Plaintiff’s ability to
17 certify a class and obtain dispositive liability and damage rulings, facilitating the settlement
18 reached in this case. *See id.*

19 Lastly, Class Counsel engaged a nationally recognized consulting expert, Greenfield
20 Advisors, to assist Plaintiff and Class Counsel in calculating the fair market rental value

1 damages claimed by Plaintiff and the Class. *Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. B. Greenfield Advisors and Class
2 Counsel utilized a proprietary and sophisticated Automated Valuation Model to determine
3 a rent-to-price ratio and calculate the rental value of Class members’ properties during all
4 times in which Defendant interfered with their exclusive right to pre-foreclosure
5 possession. *Id.* at ¶ 9, Ex. B. While this process was complicated and laborious, it was
6 necessary to determine damages suffered by each Class member. *Id.* Ultimately, the fair
7 market rental value damages, coupled with fee restitution damages, physical damage Class
8 members’ homes, and personal property damages resulted in an initial mediation demand
9 of \$71,719,763.50.¹ *Id.* at Ex. A.

10 Plaintiff and Class Counsel’s strategic and efficient use of Defendant’s documents
11 and system, Defendant’s deposition testimony, their pending discovery motion, favorable
12 rulings on class certification and liability in similar cases, and extensive class wide damage
13 calculation modeling, were persuasive and effective. On November 28, 2017 the parties,
14 along with associated counsel, attended mediation in San Francisco, CA in front of the
15 Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.) with JAMS. *Id.*, at ¶ 10; Declaration of Beth Terrell (“Terrell
16 Decl.”), at ¶ 8. Although the parties spent all day mediating with Judge Cahill, they were
17 unable to reach settlement. *Id.* at ¶ 11. Through Judge Cahill, the parties continued to engage
18 in settlement discussion for a number of weeks subsequent to the in-person mediation. *Id.*

19
20 ¹ This demand amount did not include treble damages or attorney’s fees or costs.

1 They ultimately entered into a term sheet containing the terms of settlement in principle
2 between the parties. *Id.* at Ex. D. The term sheet contained the general terms of settlement,
3 including a common fund settlement in the amount of \$23,850,000. *Id.*

4 Class Counsel drafted a comprehensive settlement agreement that contained as
5 exhibits drafts of the pleadings necessary for a motion for preliminary approval of the
6 settlement. *Id.* at ¶ 12. Class Counsel exchanged these drafts with Defense counsel and was
7 surprised to learn the parties did not agree to the scope of the release. *Id.* Class Counsel
8 therefore drafted a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement as set forth on the signed
9 term sheet. *Id.* Plaintiff and Class Counsel also advocated for an additional mediation
10 session. *Id.*

11 The parties eventually agreed to attend a second mediation, hiring Eric D. Green of
12 Resolutions, LLC in Boston, Massachusetts, a nationally recognized mediator with
13 extensive experience resolving large class action lawsuits. *Id.* at ¶ 13. The second
14 mediation lasted all day and well into the evening. *Id.* At its conclusion, the parties entered
15 into a comprehensive Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims. *Id.* at Ex. F. (the
16 “Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement Agreement *increased* the common fund
17 settlement by almost \$2.5 million, for a total common fund of \$26,305,000.00 *Id.*

18 On June 19, 2018 Plaintiff filed her Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
19 Settlement. ECF No. 59. On June 25, 2018 the Court entered its Order Granting Unopposed
20 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement. ECF No. 62.

1 **B. The Settlement.**

2 The settlement requires the Defendant to pay 26,305,000.00 into a non-reversionary
3 common fund (the “Settlement Fund”). Gatens Decl., Ex. F at § V. 1. Each Class member
4 who submits a valid claim form will be deemed a “Settlement Class Member” and will
5 receive a share of the Settlement Fund, after deduction of approved settlement costs, as
6 follows: (i) \$80.00 as compensation for physical damage done to the Class member’s
7 property when a lock was drilled out and replaced; (ii) \$100.00 for each Settlement Class
8 Member regarding whom Defendant has evidence of personal property removal; and (iii)
9 rental value damages from the remaining Settlement Fund calculated based on each
10 Settlement Class Member’s reasonable fair market rental value damage as calculated by
11 damages consultant Greenfield Advisors. *Id.* at § V. 3(a)-(c). Because it is not likely that
12 there will be a 100% claims rate, and because Class Counsel is seeking a fee and cost award
13 significantly less than 25% of the common fund, the average Settlement Class Member
14 award will likely exceed \$5,500.00 per Settlement Class Member. The settlement provides
15 significant monetary relief for the Class.

16 **III. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT**

17 **A. The percentage-of-the-fund method is the appropriate method for**
18 **determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee in this case.**

19 Because Washington law governs all of the claims in this case, attorneys’ fees should
20 be awarded in accordance with Washington law. *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d
1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under Washington law, the percentage-of-recovery approach

1 is used in calculating fees in common fund cases.” *Id.* (citing *Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*,
2 121 Wn.2d 52, 72, 847 P.2d 440 (1993)). “In common fund cases, the size of recovery
3 constitutes a suitable measure of the attorney’s performance.” *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72.
4 And the percentage-approach makes sense: “When attorney fees are available to prevailing
5 class action plaintiffs, plaintiffs will have less difficulty obtaining counsel and greater
6 access to the judicial system. Little good comes from a system where justice is available
7 only to those who can afford its price.” *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 71; compare *Vizcaino*, 290
8 F.3d at 1050 n.5 (noting perverse incentives created by lodestar method).

9 By contrast, Courts typically apply the lodestar method only when the class-wide
10 recovery is difficult to quantify. *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935,
11 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (courts use the lodestar method when the relief is “primarily injunctive
12 in nature and thus not easily monetized”); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029
13 (9th Cir. 1998) (the lodestar method is appropriate when “there is no way to gauge the net
14 value of the settlement or any percentage thereof.”). Here, the benefit to the Class is easily
15 quantified: it is the \$26,305,000.00 common fund.

16 The percentage-of-the-fund method is the appropriate method for determining a
17 reasonable fee in this case. Class Counsel’s efforts resulted in a \$26,305,000 common fund,
18 all of which will be distributed to Class members after administration expenses, Court-
19 approved fees and costs, and Court-approved service awards are deducted. Class Counsel

20 levied their significant experience in litigating class claims for pre-foreclosure lock
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND SERVICE AWARD - Page 7

1 changes to negotiate an early and substantial settlement—the first and most substantial
2 settlement in this field—which kept the total attorneys’ fees and costs low in comparison
3 to the significant benefit to the Class. Using the percentage method in this case will
4 recognize Class Counsel’s efficiency and the significant recovery they obtained for the
5 Class without penalizing Class Counsel for an early settlement that avoided the increased
6 expense and risk of protracted litigation.

7 **B. A fee award request of 12.5% of the common fund is reasonable under the**
8 **circumstances.**

9 The Ninth Circuit instructs that 25% is “a proper benchmark figure,” with common
10 fund fees typically ranging from 20% to 30% of the fund. *In re Coordinated Pretrial*
11 *Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1997)
12 (citation omitted); *see also In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 942 (“[C]ourts typically calculate
13 25% of the fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award, providing adequate
14 explanation in the record of any ‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure.”). The 25%
15 benchmark is the starting point for the analysis, and the percentage may be adjusted up or
16 down based on the court’s consideration of “all of the circumstances of the case.” *Vizcaino*,
17 290 F.3d at 1048. In *Vizcaino*, the court considered the following factors in upholding a
18 28% fee: (1) whether counsel achieved exceptional results for the class; (2) the level of risk
19 involved in the case; (3) whether counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the cash
20 settlement fund; (4) whether the requested percentage is at or below the market rate; and

1 (5) whether the case was litigated on a contingency basis, required counsel to incur costs,
2 and required counsel to forego other work. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048–50.

3 Here, Class Counsel request an “all in” fee and cost award of 12.5% of the common
4 fund, equaling \$3,288,125.00. This fee award is considerably less than the \$6,576,250.00
5 fee award that would be calculated from this Circuit’s 25% bench-mark. As detailed below,
6 this request appropriately satisfies the *Vizcaino* factors and recognizes “the circumstances
7 of the case.” *Id.*, at 1048.

8 **1. Class Counsel achieved an exceptional result for the class.**

9 a. *Class Counsel leveraged their experience and past successes*
10 *into an exceptional result for the class.*

11 Cognizant of the many barriers that could have prevented class members from
12 obtaining *any* recovery, Class Counsel deployed an aggressive and efficient litigation
13 strategy from the moment it filed Ms. Rhodes complaint. That strategy ultimately garnered
14 a swift and significant settlement for the Plaintiff and the Class. Class Counsel have spent
15 the better part of a decade gaining specialized knowledge of the policies, practices, and
16 legal landscape pertinent to the pre-foreclosure property preservation industry. Gatens
17 Decl. at ¶¶ 2–4. They used that experience to narrowly target this litigation and focus on
18 the most viable liability and damage theories. *Id.* For example, Class Counsel focused this
19 case on lock changes, as opposed to less viable theories challenging exterior-only
20 trespasses, breach of contract, or arising out of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

1 Compare ECF No. 1–2 with *Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC*, No. 2:14-cv-0175-TOR,
2 ECF No. 71 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2015), *Bund v. Safeguard Props., LLC*, No. C16-
3 920MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6217 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2018), and *Bess v. Ocwen*
4 *Loan Servicing, LLC*, 727 Fed. Appx. 918 (9th Cir. 2018).

5 Class Counsel’s experience also allowed them to immediately issue comprehensive
6 discovery targeted at Defendant’s common policies and practices pertaining to pre-
7 foreclosure lock changes; sort through tens of thousands of pages of non-responsive or
8 irrelevant productions; move the discovery stage of the litigation forward rapidly
9 (culminating in damaging Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) depositions); and set the stage for an
10 early and favorable settlement. Gatens Decl., at ¶¶ 4, 7. Class Counsel also utilized liability
11 and class certification rulings it obtained in similar cases to facilitate early settlement.
12 Gatens Decl., at Ex. A; *see also Jordan*, No. 2:14-CV-0175-TOR, ECF No. 207; *Jordan v.*
13 *Nationstar Mortg., LLC*, No. 2:14-cv-0175-TOR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193000 (E. D.
14 Wash. Nov. 21, 2017); *Bund*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6217. Leveraging their past
15 successes, Class Counsel were able to avoid the need to duplicate similar certification and
16 dispositive motions practice. And the efficiency with which Class Counsel obtained this
17 settlement is itself a benefit to the Class: “further litigation would have delayed any
18 potential recovery for the Class and have been costly and risky.” *Perkins v LinkedIn Corp.*,
19 No. 13-cv-04303-LHK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18649 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).

1 *b. Class Counsel obtained a significant common fund settlement*
2 *for Plaintiff and the Class.*

3 “The overall result and benefit to the class from the litigation is the most critical
4 factor in granting a fee award.” *In re Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. After the first
5 round of mediation the parties reached a non-reversionary common fund settlement of
6 \$23,850,000.00 in favor of the Plaintiff and the Class. Gatens Decl. at Ex. D. And while
7 this initial settlement for \$23,850,000.00 was remarkable in and of itself, Plaintiff and Class
8 Counsel ultimately *walked away* from the deal, refusing to agree to the expanded release
9 sought by the Defendant without further compensation for the Class. *Id.* at ¶ 12. Class
10 Counsel then expended considerable time and energy preparing to move to compel
11 enforcement of the original settlement while simultaneously negotiating with Defendant to
engage in a second mediation. *Id.*

12 Class Counsel’s efforts were effective: –at the second mediation, Class Counsel
13 increased the settlement amount by \$2,455,000, for a total non-reversionary common fund
14 of \$26,305,000. *Id.* at Ex. F. Class Counsel’s management of this case was a substantial
15 success. *Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)
16 (noting plaintiffs’ “substantial success”).

17 **2. Class Counsel assumed a significant risk of no recovery.**

18 Class Counsel’s fee request is also intended to recognize the significant risk they
19 assumed in this case. *See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 954-55
20

1 (9th Cir. 2015) (Upholding fee award and noting that “class counsel risked great time and
2 effort and advanced significant costs on behalf of the class action.”).

3 Class Counsel represented Plaintiff and the Class entirely on a contingent basis.
4 Gatens Decl. at ¶ 15. “With respect to the contingent nature of the litigation ... courts tend
5 to find above-market-value fee awards more appropriate in this context given the need to
6 encourage counsel to take on contingency-fee cases for plaintiffs who otherwise could not
7 afford to pay hourly fees.” *Destefano*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *60 (citing *In re Wash.*
8 *Public Power*, 19 F.3d at 1299).

9 There was therefore a very real risk that Class Counsel would not recover their fees
10 and costs at all. Class Counsel had already suffered significant losses in similar cases—
11 including a pre-foreclosure lockout case against Wells Fargo. Gatens Decl. at ¶ 16;
12 Declaration of Peter Spadoni (“Spadoni Decl.”) at ¶¶ 7–8. At the time they filed Ms.
13 Rhodes complaint, Class counsel had not obtained any favorable judgment or settlement in
14 any related case. *See id.* And despite their success in front of the State Supreme Court in
15 *Jordan*, 185 Wn.2d 876, similar cases demonstrate that pre-foreclosure lock out cases did
16 (and continue to) carry significant risk.

17 After the Washington Supreme Court’s July 7, 2016 ruling, *Jordan* was remanded
18 back to the District Court for further proceedings. *See Jordan*, 185 Wn.2d 876. The Federal
19 Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) almost immediately successfully moved to intervene
20 and argued that federal law preempted Washington law prohibiting pre-foreclosure lock

1 changes on any home in which a government sponsored entity (“GSE”)—most notably
2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—held any interest. *Jordan*, No. 2:14-CV-0175-TOR, ECF
3 No. 113, ECF No. 118; Gatens Decl., at ¶ 17. FHFA’s arguments weighed heavily on Class
4 Counsel: they had no way to know the number of potential class members in this case with
5 GSE loans, but the percentage could very well have been most or all of the class. Gatens
6 Decl., at ¶ 17. On March 19, 2017, the Court denied FHFA’s motion. *Jordan v. Nationstar*
7 *Mortg., LLC*, 240 F. Supp.3d 1114 (E.D. Wash. 2017). But FHFA remained an active party
8 in the case and continued to emphasize the risk of a successful appeal at the conclusion of
9 the litigation. *See Jordan*, No. 2:14-cv-0175-TOR, ECF Nos. 152, 274, 278; Gatens Decl.,
10 at ¶ 18.

11 Along with the FHFA, the defendant in *Jordan* also filed a Motion to Decertify the
12 Class, arguing that numerous individualized issues precluded class-wide adjudication.
13 *Jordan*, No. 2:14-cv-0175-TOR, ECF No. 119; Gatens Decl., at ¶ 19. Because Class
14 Counsel (rightly) suspected that Wells Fargo’s practices in procedures would largely mirror
15 those at issue in *Jordan*, they knew Nationstar’s motion could make or break the instant
16 case. Gatens Decl., at ¶ 19.

17 Further, another pre-foreclosure lock change case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit
18 when Class Counsel was considering Ms. Rhodes’ case. *See Bess*, 727 Fed. Appx. 918;
19 Gatens Decl., at ¶ 20. The defendant in *Bess* had filed two separate motions to dismiss,
20 both of which were granted. *Bess v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC*, No. C15-5020BHS, 2015

1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32367 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2015), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70603 (Jun
2 1, 2015). Class Counsel’s appeal could have created binding appellate precedent
3 undermining putative class members’ claims in this case. *Bess*, 727 Fed. Appx. 918; *Gatens*
4 Decl., at ¶ 20. A motion to dismiss class allegations and seeking sanctions filed by the
5 defendant in a similar case was likewise pending at this time. *Bund*, No. 2:16-cv-920, ECF
6 No. 14; *see also Kautzman v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC*, No. C16-1940JCC, 2017
7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162894 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2017).¹

8 The stigma surrounding defaulted borrowers also posed risk to class-wide recovery.
9 *Gatens Decl.*, at ¶ 21. Among other things, Defendant asserted or implied defenses
10 premised on the notion that, because borrowers had defaulted on their loan obligations they
11 had failed to provide proper notice of their claims, caused their own damage, failed to
12 mitigate their damages, or were subject to off-sets. *Id.* While Class Counsel never lent
13 much credence to the merits of these arguments, they did recognize that Defendant’s
14 defenses could have some limited appeal to a jury and therefore could not be discounted in
15 their entirety. *Id.*

16 Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Class Counsel faced substantial risk posed
17 by lender and loan servicing industry lobbyists’ efforts to obtain legislation that would
18 immunize them from liability for pre-foreclosure lock changes. *Gatens Decl.*, ¶ 22.;

19
20 ¹ Class counsel is not involved in this case.

1 Declaration of Joseph Jordan (“Jordan Decl.”), ¶¶ 3–14; Declaration of Lili Sotelo (“Sotelo
2 Decl.”), ¶¶ 2–14. Following the *Jordan* decision, big players in the lender and loan
3 servicing industries dedicated significant efforts spanning two legislative sessions in an
4 attempt to fashion an end-run around the State Supreme Court’s decision and achieve
5 retroactive immunity for pre-foreclosure lock changes. *Id.* Had these efforts been
6 successful (they ultimately were not) Plaintiff, the Class, and Class Counsel’s ability for
7 any recovery from the Defendant would have evaporated. *Id.*

8 **3. Class Counsel’s skill and performance delivered a significant**
9 **recovery for the class that included benefits beyond the cash**
10 **settlement.**

11 Class Counsel brought more to this case than experience; they matched skilled and
12 resourced opposing counsel. “The quality of opposing counsel is also relevant to the quality
13 and skill that class counsel provided,” *Destefano*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196 at *59.
14 Lead Defense counsel consisted of two partners from a reputable law firm with over 187
15 attorneys. *Gatens Decl.*, at ¶ 23. Class Counsel’s ability to negotiate a favorable settlement
16 despite defense counsel’s quality, experience, and abundant resources supports Class
17 Counsel’s fee request. *See, e.g., Lofton v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC*, No. C 13-05665
18 YGR, (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (the “risks of class litigation against an able defendant
19 well able to defend itself vigorously” support a higher fee award).

20 *a. Class Counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the*

1 *cash settlement fund*

2 Class Counsel's performance also generated benefits beyond the common settlement
3 fund. *Cf Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1049 (citing to the District Court's finding that class
4 "counsel's performance generated benefits beyond the cash settlement fund."). In the
5 course of the litigation, the Defendant confirmed that—due to Class Counsel's efforts—it
6 no longer conducted pre-foreclosure lock changes in Washington State. *Gatens Decl.*, at ¶
7 24, Ex. G; *see Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1049 ("During the litigation, Microsoft agreed
8 to...change its personal classification practices."). Class Counsel has provided far-reaching
9 non-monetary benefits to the class and Washington borrowers in general.

10 **4. Awards in similar cases demonstrate that the requested fee is**
11 **reasonable.**

12 Class Counsel's request for 12.5% of the common fund is well below the 25%
13 common fund benchmark in this circuit and it is well below percentage fee awards in other
14 common fund settlement cases. *See e.g. Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047 (awarding 28% of the
15 common fund); *Forbes v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. W.*, 170 Wn.2d 157, 161–66, 240 P.3d 790
16 (2010) ("40 percent contingency fee based on the \$5 million settlement was fair and
17 reasonable); *Desio v. Emercon Electric Co.*, No. 2:15-CV-00346-SMJ, ECF No. 84 (E.D.
18 Wash. Feb. 7, 2018) (awarding 25% of the common fund); *Plumbers Union Local No. 12,*
19 *Pension Fund v. Ambassadors Group Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26232 (E.D. Wash.,
20 Feb. 28, 2012) (awarding 22% of the common fund).

1 A fee award of 12.5% of the common fund is all the more appropriate in this case
2 because it is an “all in” rate that includes Class Counsel’s expenses. Consideration of all
3 relevant factors confirms the reasonableness of the requested 12.5% of the settlement fund.

4 **C. A lodestar crosscheck is not required but confirms that the requested fee is**
5 **reasonable.**

6 When a court selects the percentage-of-the fund method to calculate a reasonable
7 fee, the court may use the lodestar method as a “crosscheck” to determine that the amount
8 awarded is reasonable. *Online DVD*, 779 F.3d at 949; *see also Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*,
9 No. C-16-4068MMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, *46 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (citing
10 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050–51) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that the Court may, but is not
11 required to, compare the lodestar and the 25% benchmark to determine if the 25%
12 benchmark results in an inappropriately high or low fee.”). The “primary basis of the fee
13 award remains the percentage method.” *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047, 1050–51; *see also In*
14 *Re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 942 (discussing the benefits of the percentage method “in lieu or
15 the often more time-consuming task of calculating the lodestar); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*,
16 331 F. Appx. 452, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming a 25% common fund fee award after
17 an “informal” lodestar crosscheck and despite “the relatively low time-commitment by
18 plaintiff’s counsel” because “the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving weight
19 to other factors, such as the results achieved for the class and the favorable timing of the
20 settlement”).

1 Class Counsel's lodestar information confirms that the requested fee is reasonable.

2 **1. Class Counsel's rates are consistent with rates in the community for**
3 **similar work performed by professionals with comparable skill,**
4 **experience, and reputation.**

5 When utilizing a lodestar cross check to assess a percentage fee of a common fund,
6 the Ninth Circuit instructs District Courts to apply reasonably hourly rates for the region.
7 *Online DVD-Rental*, 779 F.3d at 949; *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 941. "Generally, the
8 relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits." *Barjon v. Dalton*, 132
9 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). "Where the attorneys in question have an established rate
10 for billing clients, that rate will likely be a reasonable rate." *Bowers v. Transamerica Title*
11 *Ins. Co.*, 100 Wn.2d 581, 597, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); *see also Gates v. Deukmejian*, 987
12 F.3d 1392, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining the reasonable hourly rate, courts
13 consider declarations from counsel describing the experience and skill of the attorneys and
14 staff members who worked on the case and declarations of other attorneys regarding the
15 prevailing market rate. *Widrig v. Apfel*, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998).

16 Class Counsel have set their rates for attorneys and paralegals based on a variety of
17 factors including each professional's experience, ability, skill, education, and reputation in
18 the legal community. Gatens Decl. at ¶¶ 27-42, 45, 51-52, Ex H; Terrell Decl. at ¶ 10, Ex.
19 3; These rates are consistent with the prevailing market rate in the Eastern District of
20 Washington. Gatens Decl., at ¶¶ 51-52, Ex. I; Declaration of Dale Forman ("Forman

1 Decl.”), at ¶ 5; *Barrientos Martinez v. Auvil Fruit Company, Inc.*, No. 2:16-cv-0356-RMP,
2 ECF No. 58 at ¶ 23 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2017); *id.* at ECF No. 57 at ¶ 5. Counsel’s fee
3 request does not include work completed by administrative or clerical staff. Gatens Decl.,
4 at ¶ 48, Ex. H; Terrell Decl., at Ex. 3.

5 Class Counsel’s rates are also consistent with those approved by this district in other
6 cases. *See e.g.* Gatens Decl., at Ex. I (Chart of approved rates in the Eastern District of
7 Washington by Erica Hartlep, Staff attorney to U.S. District Court Senior Judge Edward F.
8 Shea, last updated April 10, 2015). *Plumbers Union Local No. 12, Pension Fund v.*
9 *Ambassadors Group, Inc.*, (E.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2012) (approving paralegal rates at
10 \$150/hour in 2012); *Cnty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC*,
11 No. 13-cv-3016-TOR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92110, *23 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2016)
12 (finding reasonable prevailing rates exceeding \$400 per hour for experienced counsel in
13 2016). They are likewise consistent with those approved by the Western District of
14 Washington. *See e.g. In re Infospace*, 330 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1213–14 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
15 (approving hourly rates ranging from \$300 to \$425 in 2002). Class Counsel’s rates are
16 reasonable, particularly given their expertise and the risk inherent in this case. *See Gatens*
17 *Decl.*, at ¶ 47.

18 **2. Class Counsel expended a reasonable number of hours litigating the**
19 **case.**

20 Hours are generally “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved

1 in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client.”
2 *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 431 (1983)). Class Counsel have provided a narrative
3 description of their work on this case as well as their detailed billing records detailing the
4 work performed by each attorney and paralegal. Gatens Decl, at Ex. H.¹

5 To-date Class Counsel has billed a total of 1,676.59 hours litigating, settling, and
6 administering this case. Gatens Decl., at ¶ 56, Ex. H. This total excludes time that Class
7 Counsel removed as duplicative, administrative, or arguably excessive. *Id.* at ¶ 48. While
8 beneficial to the Class, Class Counsel have included none of the time dedicated to opposing
9 banks’ and loan servicers’ legislative efforts to eliminate the Class’s claims. *Id.*, at ¶ 22.
10 The resulting hours are *less* than those that would be billed to a fee-paying client in a non-
11 contingent case. *Id.*, at ¶ 56. Class Counsel’s total lodestar is \$541,355.75. *Id.*

12 Knowing it was possible they would never be paid for their work, counsel had no
13 incentive to act in a manner that was anything but economical. *See Moreno v. City of*
14 *Sacramento*, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[L]awyers are not likely to spend
15 unnecessary time on contingent cases in the hopes of inflating their fees. The payoff is too
16 uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the fee.”); *see Spadoni Decl.* at ¶¶ 8–15;

18 ¹ Class Counsel redacted work product from their billing records. *See Democratic Party*
19 *of Wash. v. Reed*, 388 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that litigants are
20 “entitled for good reason to considerable secrecy about what went on between client and
counsel, and among counsel” and redactions appropriately “preserve secrecy about
something the ... lawyers talked about, and some issue of ... law they researched”).

1 Gatens Decl., at ¶ 47. Class Counsel’s work in this case has been undertaken to the
2 exclusion of other billable work. Spadoni Decl., at ¶ 16; Gatens Decl., at ¶ 47. Plaintiff had
3 only one partner level attorney working on this case and used associates and paralegals
4 where possible. Gatens Decl., Ex. H. Plaintiff sent only one attorney to conduct two days
5 of out-of-state depositions and only two attorneys to participate in two out of state
6 mediations which ultimately resulted in the settlement agreement in this case. *Id.* at ¶ 7;
7 Terrell Decl., at ¶ 8.

8 In short, Class Counsel leveraged their experience and prior successes to efficiently
9 develop the central facts and legal issues that shaped the favorable outcome of this case for
10 Plaintiff and the Class. They were able to do so with the ultimate effect of achieving an
11 early resolution that ensured class members timely and substantial recovery.

12 **3. The implied multiplier is reasonable and appropriate.**

13 “The purpose of this multiplier is to account for the risk Class Counsel assumes
14 when they take on a contingent-fee cases.” *Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp.*, No. 11-CV-
15 02786-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16838, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013). (citation
16 omitted). Multipliers are commonplace in attorneys’ fees awards in class actions,
17 particularly where the lodestar method is used to cross-check a percentage-of-the-fund-fee.
18 *See* Richard A. Posner, *Economic Analysis of the Law* 783 (8th Ed. 2011). “[I]n common
19 fund cases, courts that employ a pure lodestar method are not bound by the Supreme
20

1 Court’s rulings that limit multiplied lodestars in the fee-shifting context.” *Id.*; *see also*
2 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (“The bar against risk multipliers in statutory fee cases does not
3 apply to common fund cases” and “courts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect
4 the risk of non-payment in common fund cases.”).

5 *a. The implied multiplier is well within the typical range considered by*
6 *the Ninth Circuit.*

7 In the Ninth Circuit, multipliers can “range from 1.2 to 4 or even higher.” *Parkinson*
8 *v. Hyundai Motor Am.*, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2010); *Vizcaino*,
9 293 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (finding multipliers ranging from 0.6–19.6). Class Counsel requests
10 only 12.5% of the common fund, an implied multiplier of 6. Gatens Decl., at ¶ 56. Class
11 Counsel recognizes that this implied multiplier trends towards the “high end” of a
12 traditional implied multiplier. But their request is still well within the typical range
13 approved in this circuit. *See e.g. Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co.*, 248 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir.
14 2007) (holding that the 6.85 implied multiplier was “well within the range of multipliers
15 that courts have allowed”); *Craft v. City of San Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp.2d 1113, 1125
16 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining that 5.2 is a “high end multiplier” but “there is ample authority
17 for such awards resulting in this range or higher”); *Wenzel v. Colvin*, No. EDCV 11-
18 0338JEM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105823, *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (approving a 6.06
19 implied multiplier in light of class counsel’s quick settlement of the case); *Gutierrez v.*
20 *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. C07-15923WHA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67298, *23 (N.D.

1 Cal. May 21, 2015) (awarding a 5.5 implied multiplier). Class Counsel’s fee request is
2 likewise well within the range approved by other circuits in cases cited favorably by Ninth
3 Circuit District Courts. *See e.g. Craft*, 624 F. Supp.2d at 1125 (citing favorably *In re Merry-*
4 *Go-Round Enterprise, Inc.*, 244 B.R. 327 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (implied multiplier of
5 19.6), *Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6 9705 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (implied multiplier of 15.6), *In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig.*, 243
7 F.ed 722, 732 (3d Cir. 2001) (implied multiplier of 7), and *In re Rite Aid Corp. Secs. Litig.*,
8 362 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (multiplier of 6.96)); *see also Buccellato v. AT&T*
9 *Operations, Inc.*, No. C10-00463LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, *5 (N.D. Cal. Jun.
10 30, 2011) (citing favorably *Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.*, 899 F. Supp. 1297,
11 1304 (D. N.J. 1995) (9.3 implied multiplier), and *Roberts v. Texaco*, 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.
12 N.Y. 1997) (5.5 implied multiplier)).

13 **4. The implied multiplier is reasonable under the circumstances.**

14 Courts often consider the following factors when assessing the reasonableness of a
15 multiplier: “(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
16 involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of
17 other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)
18 whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
19 circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,
20

1 reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature
2 and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar
3 cases.” *Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.*, 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). The foremost
4 consideration “is the benefit obtained for the class.” *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d 941–42.

5 Application of these factors confirms that an implied multiplier of 6 is both
6 reasonable and appropriate in this case. Class Counsel took this case on a contingent basis
7 and to the preclusion of other work and to the detriment of their annual compensation.
8 Gatens Decl., at ¶¶ 15, 44, 47; Spadoni Decl., at ¶¶ 9–16. They took this case despite the
9 risk of protracted litigation or early dismissal. *Id.* They went toe to toe with an experienced
10 and well-resourced litigation team and were able to marshal their hard-earned experience
11 litigating class wide claims arising from pre-foreclosure lock changes to obtain an excellent
12 result for the class. Gatens Decl., at ¶ 23. They obtained a very favorable class settlement
13 relatively early in the litigation—the first class-wide settlement of this nature in the nation.
14 *Id.*, at ¶ 25. That Class Counsel was able to do so efficiently without resorting to protracted
15 litigation should not undermine the reasonableness of their fee request.

16 Counsel “should not be ‘punished’ for efficiently litigating this action, or for
17 otherwise providing class members with the benefits of their experience gained litigating
18 similar class cases.” *Bayat v. Bank of the West*, No. C-13-2376EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist.
19 LEXIS 50416 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015). The requested multiplier should reward “Class

20 Counsel for its efforts in achieving a swift settlement while recognizing that counsel’s
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND SERVICE AWARD - Page 24

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1 efficiency actually reduced its lodestar.” *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales*
2 *Practices & Prods. Liabl. Litig.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65931, *613–14 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
3 12, 2017). The lodestar cross check should not be used in such a way as to deter early
4 settlement. *See Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d 1043, n.5 (“We do not mean to imply that class counsel
5 should necessarily receive a lesser fee for settling a case quickly; in many instances it may
6 be a relevant circumstance that counsel achieved a timey result for the class members in
7 need of immediate relief.”). The implied multiplier is reasonable given the circumstances
8 of this case. *Cf Wenzel*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10.

9 Class Counsel’s fee request is particularly appropriate because they are only
10 requesting 12.5% of the common fund—\$3,288,125.00 *below* the Ninth Circuit’s 25%
11 benchmark. Class Counsel are not seeking separate reimbursement for their costs. *See*
12 *Gatens Decl.*, at ¶ 44, 53–55; *cf Vincent v. Hughes Air W.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir.
13 1977); *see also Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 70–74. Class Counsel are not seeking reimbursement
14 for the 92.65 hours Mr. Gatens spent opposing bank and loan servicers’ attempts to undue
15 the *Jordan* decision. *Gatens Decl.*, at ¶¶ 22, 56. Nor are Class Counsel requesting the Court
16 award them fees for projected time they anticipate they will spend drafting and filing their
17 motion for final approval, administering the settlement, addressing any objections and
18 appeals, and responding to class members through final approval and distribution of the
19 settlement funds. *Id.* at ¶ 49; *cf Kangas v. Volkswagen Grp. Of America, Inc.*, No. 17-

1 176279, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20420, *8 (9th Cir. Jul. 23, 2018) (Court can include
2 “projected time in its lodestar cross-check”).

3 In light of the circumstances in this case, the implied multiplier demonstrates that
4 Class Counsel’s request for only 12.5% of the fund is both reasonable and appropriate.

5 **D. Plaintiff requests a service award of \$10,000.**

6 Service awards that are “intended to compensate class representatives for work
7 undertaken on behalf of a class ‘are fairly typical in class action cases.’” *Online DVD-*
8 *Rental*, 779 F.3d at 943 (quoting *Rodriguez v. W. Publishing*, 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th
9 Cir. 2009)). Such awards recognize the effort class representatives expend and the financial
10 or reputational risk they undertake in bringing the case, and to recognize their willingness
11 to act as private attorneys general. *W. Publishing*, 563 F.3d at 958-59.

12 Valerie Rhodes requests a \$10,000 service award—well under .001% of the total
13 common fund. Declaration of Valerie Rhodes (“Rhodes Decl.”) at ¶ 2.; Gatens Decl., at ¶
14 58. Ms. Rhodes dedicated countless hours to this litigation, responding promptly to
15 requests from counsel, producing documents and drafting discovery responses, and
16 participating in strategic and settlement discussions. Rhodes Decl., at ¶¶ 3–5; Gatens Decl.,
17 at ¶ 58. Ms. Rhodes regularly communicated with Class Counsel. *Id.* Moreover, Ms.
18 Rhodes committed to serving as the face of this litigation—publicly facing the stigma
19 surrounding a loan default that many wish to avoid. Rhodes Decl., at ¶ 5. This case has also
20 affected other loans with which she was involved. *Id.* Ms. Rhodes request is both

1 reasonable and consistent with awards in other courts. *See e.g. Rinky Dink, Inc. v. World*
2 *Bus. Lenders, LLC*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70858, *18 (W.D. Wash. May. 31, 2016
3 (awarding \$10,000 each to two of three named plaintiffs); *Lehman v. Nelson*, 2015 U.S.
4 Dist. LEXIS 180785, *18 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2015) (awarding \$10,000 to named
5 plaintiff); *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 592 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1330, n.9 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
6 (approving \$7,500 awards and collecting cases granting incentive awards ranging from
7 \$5,000 to \$40,000).

8 IV. CONCLUSION

9 Class Counsel request that the Court approve an all-in fee and cost award of
10 3,288,125.00, which is 12.5% of the common fund created by Class Counsel's work on
11 behalf of the Class. Plaintiff requests a service award of \$10,000 in recognition of her
12 representation of the class in this case.

13 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 1st day of October, 2018.

14 s/CLAY M. GATENS

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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND SERVICE AWARD - Page 27

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 1st day of October, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System. Notice of this filing will be sent to the parties listed below by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.

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DATED at Wenatchee, Washington this 1st day of October, 2018.

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